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 Why do the poor leave the safety net in Mexico? 
A study of the effects of conditionality on dropouts 
 
1.  Introduction  
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have become a common tool for poverty 
alleviation and human capital formation among the poor, especially in Latin America.
1 Subsidies 
are given to poor families in order to: i) have a direct poverty alleviation effect by increasing 
total household income and thus their consumption, and ii) to elicit a behavioral change in these 
families so that a certain impact, such as increased investment in the human capital of the 
children of the poor, will take place. Impact evaluations of these programs have concentrated on 
verifying the behavioral changes and their related effects.
2 Much discussion has ensued related to 
whether conditioning of the subsidy is absolutely necessary to elicit the behavioral change and 
thus the impact. It has been difficult to shed light on this question given that the counterfactual, a 
randomized unconditional transfer, has not been possible to implement (Davis et al., 2006). 
While the lack of data makes it impossible to make a clear statement on the role of 
conditionality, the consensus seems to be that behavioral changes are correlated with the type of 
conditions that each program requires (Das, Do & Özler, 2005). 
Conditions have other consequences beyond the effect on beneficiaries’ behavior. In 
some programs, failing to meet the program’s conditions implies that the recipients would 
receive a reduced payment or possibly be dropped from the program’s roster. Therefore, 
conditions on the receipt of transfers may also encourage self-selection out of the program, 
thereby acting as a screening mechanism (Das, Do & Özler, 2005). Such screening mechanisms 
have been used in workfare programs by placing work requirements on program recipients that 
lead to self-selection into the program by those that are unemployed (Jalan & Ravallion, 2003; 
Galasso & Ravallion, 2003). In this paper, using data from Mexico’s Oportunidades program, 
we evaluate the role of conditionality in CCTs in inducing self-selection and increasing the 
efficiency of the targeting system of the programs. 
In targeting beneficiaries, Oportunidades employs a carefully constructed system to 
determine eligibility
3. This system is designed to minimize the errors of omission – excluding the 
poor who should be eligible for the program – and the errors of inclusion – including the non-
poor in the program.
4 Specifically, the program uses a combination of geographic and household 
proxy means test to classify families as poor, and thus eligible to participate in the program. 
First, potential recipient communities are ranked based on an index of marginality developed 
from the national population census. The marginality index is a proxy for the degree of access to 
basic goods and services at community level and thus gives a sense of how remote, and 
correspondingly poor, a community is. After communities are identified, the second step is to 
select households for participation in the program based on data collected from a household 
                                                           
1Among some are Mexico’s Oportunidades, Honduras PRAF, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social, Jamaica’s 
Path, Colombia’s Familias en Acción, Ecuador’s Bono Solidario, Brazil’s Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia, and 
Argentina’s Ingreso para el Desarrollo Humano and Jefas y Jefes.  
2 For a summary of the estimated impacts of Mexico’s Progresa program – the name of Oportunidades prior to 2001 
– see Skoufias (2005). For an evaluation of the Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social see Maluccio & Flores (2004).  
3 Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades (2001-2005) Rules of Operation. www.oportunidades.gob.mx  
4 See Cornia & Scott (1995).   4
census within the community. A proxy means test is calculated for each household using 
discriminant analysis and households above the cut-off point are deemed eligible as 
beneficiaries. The key factors used to discriminate between the poor and non-poor are observable 
household assets that indicate relative wealth. Once families are incorporated, they remain in the 
program, and receive benefits, if they follow the protocol of conditions placed on receipt of the 
subsidies.  
While the targeting of beneficiaries is carefully designed, the program may include the 
non-poor for two reasons
5. First, the creation of a wealth index using discriminant analysis is at 
best an approximation of income or consumption poverty and it may be the case that this index 
allows the inclusion of non-poor households. Second, the program has been in operation for a 
number of years and the benefits of the program may results in some households no longer being 
considered poor. Similarly, the exclusion of the poor may be related to two factors. Given the 
initial geographic targeting of the program to marginal communities, the poor that happen to live 
in better off communities may be missed at least in the earlier years of operation. Furthermore, 
new poor households may form in communities after the roster has been created leaving out new 
households. To manage these issues of dynamic changes in the welfare status of beneficiaries, 
the program returns to survey the communities every three years, and, based on a proxy means 
test, verifies the eligibility of current recipients and determines if new households in the 
community are eligible for the program. 
In addition to administrative rules and actions to update the roster and verify continual 
eligibility, households may self-select out of the program. That is, through failing to meet the 
conditions of the program or failing to pick up their checks, a significant number of households 
get dropped from the roster and lose their eligibility for transfers. If this is simply the result of 
the quasi-poor opting out of the program because the opportunity costs of conditionality are too 
great, conditionality is acting as a screening mechanism that minimizes the errors of inclusion 
and thus improves targeting. However, dropping out of the program may be related to a 
completely different phenomenon. It could be the case that conditionality places unreasonably 
high costs on very poor households making them unable to receive the transfer and therefore 
working against the program’s objective of protecting the most vulnerable. For example, the 
costs associated with enrolling and attending school, attending health lectures or visiting health 
clinics may be high for poor households, particularly those in distant, marginal communities 
where transport costs are high. If this is the case, dropouts may then increase the errors of 
omission by making ineligible the very households that the program is intending to target. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of households that drop out of 
the program to determine if these are a result of self-targeting by the non-poor, the exclusion of 
the target poor population or a combination of both. Towards this end, section 2 discusses the 
Oportunidades program in detail including a description of the eligibility requirements and the 
conditionality associated with the program. Section 3 then describes the data set used to evaluate 
dropouts. The analysis uses the administrative data from the program, including data from the 
household census conducted to determine eligibility, as well as administrative data on the length 
of time households remained in the program. Section 4 presents the empirical approach used in 
the analysis. In particular, we estimate a discrete non-repeatable one-way duration model that 
explains the hazard rate, h(t), or the risk of dropping out of the program at time t, given that the 
                                                           
5 For an analysis of targeting errors in the rural sector see, Skoufias, Davis & de la Vega, (1999). For an evaluation 
of targeting in urban areas se,e Coady and Parker (2004).    5
event did not occur before time t. In section 5, the results of this analysis are presented. Finally, 
conclusions and policy implications are presented in section 6. 
 
2. The effect of program eligibility and conditions on dropouts 
The targeting system Oportundidades used to identify beneficiary households is 
described in the introduction. Within those household declared eligible, in most cases payment is 
provided directly to mothers under the assumption they are more likely to use the resources to 
benefit their family and children. The degree of eligibility and therefore the amount of transfer is 
dependent on the composition of the household and in particular on the number and age of 
children. Oportunidades has two different forms of cash transfers: a basic transfer composed of a 
food grant, to which school scholarships grants are added if children in the family are of school 
age. Each type of transfer is linked to separate and independent conditionality requirements.  
The food grant, which is the same amount for each beneficiary household, is conditional 
on health check-ups for all family members and attendance by the recipient to public health 
lectures. At registration, households set up a schedule of health appointments for all relevant 
household members for the year. This information is given to the health provider and attendance 
records are maintained. Along with these check-ups, transfer recipients are also asked to attend 
health and nutrition talks at the health clinic. The health provider is required to fill in a form 
every two months certifying beneficiary attendance at these talks. This results in a report to the 
Oportunidades administrators indicating the beneficiary family is in compliance with the 
conditions of the basic food transfer or is not. Failure to be compliant for four consecutive 
months (two bimonthly periods) or for six non-consecutive months out of any twelve months 
(three bimonthly periods out of six) results in the family being dropped from the program. 
School scholarships are linked to specific children and thus differ by household. The 
grants are awarded to beneficiaries during the school calendar year and all children over 7 and 
under 18 (for grades 3 through 9) are eligible. Children must register and ensure regular 
attendance (a monthly attendance rate of 85%) to receive the award. School officials verify 
registration by signing a form for each family and certify attendance through submitting 
attendance forms to the proper authorities. If attendance requirements are not met, the amount 
linked to that particular child is deducted from the bimonthly total payment to the family. Failure 
to meet the conditions associated with children’s schooling, therefore, does not result in 
expulsion from the program but rather in a reduced payment.  
The health and schooling conditions described above are clearly not without costs. The 
principal cost for the household of meeting conditions is the opportunity cost of time. Being 
present at public lectures, scheduling and making health check-ups and attending school all 
require using valuable household labor time. The time involved in getting to the health centers 
and schools can also represent a significant amount of time. It is also likely to incur a direct cash 
cost for transportation, particularly for more remote households. The expectation then is that 
those households with the greatest opportunity cost of time are the most likely to fail to meet the 
conditions of the program; namely; those with other economic opportunities which are likely to 
be the relatively better off households. This is the screening mechanism described in the 
introduction that may lead to self-targeting. Additionally, however, given the costs of 
transportation, it may be the case that more marginal households with limited infrastructure 
access or who are cash constrained could potentially also find it difficult to meet the conditions   6
of the program; that is, the extremely poor. Thus, we may find that both the better off and 
poorest households may find themselves leaving the program as a result of their actions. 
Thus far, we have assumed that only the actions of households can lead them to dropping 
out of the program. There are other mechanisms other than failing to meet conditions that can 
lead to being dropped out. First, reporting mechanisms to enforce conditions rely on health 
personnel filling in forms to inform the program of noncompliance on the part of families. In 
such a situation with such a large program, this in itself may lead to some problems. In fact, as 
shall be seen in the subsequent sections of the paper, the efficiency of the health provider may 
influence reporting of compliance and thus the ability of beneficiaries to stay in the program. 
Another reason that may lead to drop out is failing to pick-up the transfer payment two periods in 
a row. By rules, this leads to the recipient being dropped. However, while this can be the result 
of recipient behavior and could be linked to the opportunity cost of time and the costs associated 
with transportation, it can also be the result of administrative problems. For example, to pick up 
a check requires having an identification card that is supplied by the program. If for some reason, 
the program fails to deliver in time all proper identification to the recipient, they cannot pick up 
their check and thus could be dropped out. Additional mechanisms that may lead to being 
dropped form the program are related to other aspects of the administration of the program. The 
program regularly has audits of the procedures and an audit may find that a recipient should not 
have been eligible.  
To summarize, three triggers lead to a recipient being dropped from the program: i) 
reported as failing to meet health conditions two periods in a row or for three out of six periods; 
ii) failing to pick-up payments two periods in a row; or iii) administrative audits. Note that not all 
dropouts may be due to the behavior of households, in all of the above administrative glitches, or 
“shocks” could be playing a large role in the survival function of households in the program. To 
ensure the analysis properly assesses the influence of behavioral factors, in the analysis below, 
we are careful to control for these other factors. 
 
3. Oportunidades’ administrative data 
The data used in this analysis comes from the administrative information of the 
Oportunidades program. The program collects information on when beneficiaries enter the 
program as well as if and when they drop out. For each rural community in which Oportunidades 
operates, the program conducts a census of households in the community – referred to as the 
ENCASEH – to determine eligibility. The questionnaire used for the census consists of detailed 
socio-economic information, including the characteristics of the recipient and household, 
measures of household income and sources, and receipt of public assistance programs. The 
administrative data also includes the community marginality index, used for the geographic 
targeting noted above, and the score (or puntaje) used for the household targeting. Finally, the 
administrative information includes other data such as the health provider used by the 
beneficiary household for check-ups.
6 Once constructed into a single data set, the data includes 
significant details on the characteristics of the beneficiary households at the time of entry into the 
program as well as administrative details. 
                                                           
6 Health providers are the state health secretariat services or the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social´s IMSS-
Oportunidades program.   7
As of 2005, Oportunidades had incorporated 5 million participants including over 3.3 
million in rural areas. For this analysis, we focus on rural areas since this is where there is greater 
concern that conditions may lead to households dropping out and where most of the extreme 
poor in Mexico reside. Given the volume of data, it was necessary to take a subsample of the 
administrative data to analyze. First, we decided to work only with the four cohorts that entered 
the program in 1998
7, rather than all of the cohorts that entered the program between 1997 and 
2004. The choice of this set of cohorts is based on the following reasons: i) these cohorts had 
been in the program for a significant amount of time allowing for longer-term analysis of 
dropouts; ii) the program was dramatically expanded in 1998 so these are large cohorts (1.6 
million households) with national coverage; and iii) taking four cohorts instead of one helps to 
reduce cohort specific issues while working with a reduced number of cohorts allows us to more 
easily control for cohort and time-specific events. In total, a one percent sample of the cohorts 
was constructed creating a data set of 16,017 households.
8 Eight percent belongs to the cohort 
that entered in the first bimonthly period of 1998 (January-February), 61 percent in the fourth 
bimonthly period (July-August), five percent in the fifth (September-October), and 26 percent in 
the last bimonthly period of the year (November-December).  
Oportunidades is organized around a bimonthly payment. While entry into the program 
depends on when Oportunidades enters the communities and initiates the program, beneficiaries 
are not required to meet program conditions immediately and therefore are not at risk of 
dropping out until the next (or second) period begins. Beneficiaries have the entire two-month 
period to meet conditions and can only be dropped out or drop out by failing to meet conditions 
at these discrete two-month intervals. Thus, the first time beneficiaries can be dropped out is at 
the end of the second period of risk and after this they can only be dropped from the program at 
the end of these two-month intervals. The risk of dropping out of the program at time t, given 
that the “dropout event” did not occur before time t – that is the hazard rate – is defined as the 
total number of dropouts over the risk set in a given two-month period. Since beneficiaries enter 
the risk set one period after they are incorporated into the program, we calculate the conditional 
probability distribution for dropping out from the second bimonthly period of 1998 (March-
April) to the fourth bimonthly period of 2004 (August-September) which is the last period for 
which data is currently available. This gives up to 39 observation points in time for each 
household. In total, we end up with a sample of 514,972 observations for the 16,017 households. 
Before analyzing this data in detail, we will characterize the basic behavior of dropouts over time 
and provide descriptive statistics of the covariates of the model. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Figure 1 shows the dropout rates over the discrete periods in question while Figure 2 is a 
smoothed version of the hazard function.
9 The figures show that the pace at which beneficiaries 
leave the program is not constant over time. Dropouts accelerate until reaching a peak in period 
14 and the risk of dropping out stays relatively high until it begins to decrease after thirty 
bimonthly periods. The discrete hazard function shows the existence of significant peaks at 
                                                           
7 Note that while there are six potential bimonthly periods per year, in 1998 new recipients only entered in four of 
them – January-February, July-August, September-October and November-December. 
8 For three percent of households, there was incomplete information in the corresponding ENCASEH and the 
household was therefore not included. There is no reason to suspect losing these observations leads to any 
systematic problems with the data. 
9 The smoothed version of the hazard function is created using a kernel function.   8
certain periods suggests that dropouts may be linked to factors other than self-selection out of the 
program. In particular, in evaluating the data there is some concern that dropouts in certain 
periods are related to changes in administrative procedures. For example, note in Figure 1 that 
the largest dropout occurs during the first risk period, or when Oportunidades administrators 
possibly fail to turn in all paper work and instructions in time to eligible beneficiaries. Detailed 
discussions with Oportunidades administrators noted a number of operational issues that may 
have affected the probability of dropping out. Since the program was launched, the procedures to 
monitor whether beneficiaries are meeting conditions have improved significantly. Two 
important changes happened during the periods in question: (i) the introduction of guidelines of 
operational rules (‘Reglas de Operacion’) in mid-1999 and, (ii) the introduction of a just-in-time 
monitoring system
10 in mid-2000. Additionally, there were changes in the puntaje to make it 
national in scope that implied reclassifying the eligibility status of many families, as well as 
changes in the payment system from cash payments to the individual to direct deposits in bank 
accounts set up for some families.  
Each of these occurrences may influence the probability of dropping out of the program 
and thus need to be controlled for in the subsequent analysis. In each case, these are time-specific 
events; that is, they occurred at specific calendar time periods and can thus be controlled for in 
regression analysis with appropriate dummy variables. These variables were thus included in the 
data set with those described above. Specifically, two dummy variables are created to account for 
the introduction of the operational guidelines (dummy equals 1 after 1999.4), and changes in the 
monitoring system of the program (dummy equals 1 after 2000.4). These two dummies identify 
if there was an upward or downward shift in the hazard function after these two changes. 
Furthermore, we have the following calendar time-specific dummies to deal with other 
administrative issues: (i) implementation of guidelines (1999.4), (ii) distribution of new 
identification cards (Hologramas) (2000.3 and again in 2001.3), (iii) problems with payment 
withdrawals (2002.6), (iv) no delivery of debit card or no signature of Bansefi contracts (2003.2), 
and (v) correction of inclusion errors (2003.4, 2003.5 and 2003.6). Unlike the introduction of the 
operational guidelines and monitoring system, these were single events at a point in calendar 
time and are thus controlled for with dummies for the specific calendar time. 
[FIGURE 3 HERE]  
Figure 3 shows the survivor function, which suggests that on average approximately 
0.5% of households in the program dropout every bimonthly period.  Furthermore, over the 39 
periods or 6.5 years nearly one out of every five participants that entered the program in 1998 
has dropped out. 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
As noted previously, the principal goal of this paper is to determine whether relatively 
poor or rich households are leaving the program. Although this issue is examined in detail later 
in the paper, as an initial examination of this issue we decompose the dropout survivor function 
by wealth category. As noted, targeting at the household level is done through the puntaje, which 
is a wealth index based on the assets of the household. At the beginning of the program, different 
regional models of the index coexisted, which classified the households as “eligible” or “non-
eligible” based on its relative regional position. In 2001, Oportunidades started to operate with a 
unique national model to create the puntaje and reclassified households accordingly. In order to 
                                                           
10 This system is known as the Sistema Integral de Información (SIIOP).   9
make the puntaje comparable among all the 1998 cohorts and following Oportunidades’ 
practice, we re-classified the households using the national puntaje model. Using this 
reclassification, Figure 4 presents the survivor functions by the top and bottom three wealth 
deciles. The figure shows that the richest beneficiaries (deciles 1 to 3) have steeper survivor 
functions than the poorest ones.  
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Along similar lines, we examine the survivor functions by marginality index. The 
marginality index is the index used for the geographic targeting of communities in the program 
and measures community remoteness and poverty.  Figure 5 shows the survivor functions of the 
top and bottom three deciles.  As can be seen from the figure, household in the richest 
communities (deciles 1 and 2) are leaving the program faster than the households from the 
poorest ones. Taken together, these findings suggest that poorer households and households in 
poorer communities tend to be less likely to dropout than richer households and households in 
richer communities thus supporting the hypothesis that conditionality is leading to wealthy 
households self-selecting out of the program.  This is explored in greater detail below. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis, Table 1 presents summary statistics of the 
characteristics of the households in the sample prior to entering the program.  The data is also 
divided by households that have dropped out and households that are still in the program with 
initial tests of difference. Results indicate that the recipients of the dropout group relative to the 
active group are characterized by: a higher proportion of males, older, more average years of 
education, a higher proportion non-indigenous, a lower proportion that are married and a higher 
proportion that works. Households that have dropped out of the program tend have fewer 
members, a lower dependency rate and less poor (as measured by the puntaje) on average than 
the households that remain active. Moreover, receiving income from a relative that does not live 
in the same household is more usual among households that have dropped out. Furthermore, 
receiving any kind of other public assistance is more likely in the group that stays in the 
program. At the community level, households that have dropped out on average belong to richer 
communities than the ones that are poorer.  Finally, households that use the health provider IMSS 
Solidaridad appear to have a low level of dropouts.  
 
4. Analyzing dropouts: the empirical approach 
To evaluate the reasons beneficiary households drop out of the Oportunidades program, a 
duration model is employed. This type of model is appropriate when trying to evaluate events in 
which a change from one state to another occurs and the timing of this transition between states 
is of interest. Duration models, which is also referred to as survival analysis or event history 
analysis, are used to examine similar types of transitions, such as the length of time a worker 
remains unemployed, the time a person remains married or the survival time of a terminally ill 
patient, that is studied here (Greene, 2003). In our case, we are interested in determining the 
factors influencing both the probability of dropping out and examining the timing of dropouts. 
Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, there are certain administrative events that 
occurred at points in calendar time.  A duration model allows us to examine these factors of 
interest while controlling for these calendar-specific administrative events.   10
As noted in the project description above, the Oportunidades program is organized 
around a bimonthly payment program. While entry into the program depends on when 
Oportunidades enters the communities and initiates the program, beneficiaries are not required to 
meet program conditions immediately and therefore are not at risk until the next period begins. 
Beneficiaries have the entire two-month period to meet conditions and can only be dropped out, 
or drop out by failing to meet conditions, at these discrete two-month intervals. As such, the 
appropriate model for analysis is a discrete duration model (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). 
Since data is available for all beneficiary households from the onset of the program, there is no 
left-censoring or left-truncation of the data. However, communities were entered in a staggered 
pattern so that new cohorts are included in the program at different initial time periods, which 
implies flow sampling. All beneficiaries either drop out or remain in the program and since data 
is for a limited period of time the data is subject to right censoring with those observations that 
are right-censored being those that did not drop out of the program in the period in question. 
Finally, beneficiaries do not reenter the program once they have dropped out and are thus only 
observed for a single spell.
11 
Given the discrete nature of the data and the other characteristics mentioned above, the 
analysis of the data can be conducted using standard discrete dependent variable models such as 
the logit or probit. There are no clear reasons to choose one over the other and in this case a logit 
model is used.
12 The data are organized in such a way so that in each period beneficiaries are at 
risk they receive a zero if they did not drop out and a one if they did drop out. Beneficiaries that 
never drop out receive a zero in every period for which they are at risk. Dropouts are explained 
by both time invariant and time variant covariates. In a discrete model, duration is incorporated 
into the model by including a time variable in the regression. The manner in which this is 
included depends on assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard function; that is, the 
expected shape of the pattern of dropouts. If a certain form is assumed, the parameters of that 
form can be estimated. Alternatively, a nonparametric approach such as including dummy 
variables for each period of hazard is reasonable, particularly if the analysis is principally 
focused on explaining dropouts and not predicting the hazard function (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 2004). While we are primarily interested in explaining dropouts and not the hazard 
function, we do wish to use the function to examine differences in hazard rates for certain 
categories of the sample. As such, we examined both parametric and non-parametric approaches. 
The results are robust across specification and we focus our attention on the approach in which a 
polynomial is used to represent the hazard function. 
 
5. Factors influencing drop outs 
Table 2 presents the results for the analysis of dropouts based on the duration model 
described in the previous section. Odds ratios are reported instead of coefficients for ease of 
interpretation.  The results indicate a number of characteristics of the beneficiary influence the 
odds of dropping out and we begin by looking at the characteristics of the individual 
beneficiaries themselves. If the recipient is male, the odds of them dropping out are significantly 
higher. Male recipients are less than 10% of the recipient population and usually indicate that an 
                                                           
11 There is some possibility that households reentered the program later if they reapplied in the subsequent entry 
round.  However, Oportunidades’ officials suggested the incidence of this appears low and should not be important 
in this analysis. 
12 Results for the probit model mirrored those of the logit model indicating the choice of logit is unimportant.   11
adult female is not in the house. Older recipients also have higher odds of dropping out although 
this effect appears to slightly diminish with age. This suggests that those below a certain age are 
more likely to drop out.  As the number of years of education increases, the recipient is 
significantly less likely to drop out suggesting the higher educated are more likely to stay in the 
program. Recall that on average recipients have only 2.9 years of education and that 37% have 
no formal education. The result may indicate that, controlling for other factors, those with some 
education may see the value of education and are more likely to want to take advantage of 
Oportunidades.  Beneficiaries that are indigenous – as defined by the fact they do not speak 
Spanish – are more likely to drop out.  There is some concern that language barriers may limit 
the ability of households to comply with conditions so this issue is explored further below. 
Single-headed households are also found to have greater odds of dropping out which may 
indicate that such families have a harder time meeting conditions with only one primary adult in 
the family.  Finally, those recipients who were working outside the home at the time of the initial 
survey are found to have greater odds of dropping out.  This is most likely because the 
opportunity cost of time is high and they are thus unable to meet conditions as easily. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Moving to household variables, the results indicate that households with a higher 
dependency ratio and greater household size have lower odds of dropping out indicating that the 
composition of the household influences drop outs.  There is some concern that these households 
may be more likely to drop out because of the greater burden of conditions that require all 
household members to receive check-up and even more for certain children, but the results 
indicate this concern is unfounded.  Similar to the results for recipient employment, those that 
received private transfers from family members (mostly remittances) are more likely to drop out. 
This is possibly because they have less of a need for Oportunidades transfers, and prefer to 
substitute a conditional transfer for an unconditional one. Those that were receiving public 
assistance from the government before Oportunidades, however, are less likely to drop out. 
Those receiving such assistance are likely to be the extreme poor and thus are expected to be less 
likely to drop out. 
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
As discussed previously, a principal concern of this paper is determining the relationship 
between wealth – as measured by the puntaje index – and dropping out with our hypothesis 
being that the richest and poorest households may be most susceptible to dropping out of the 
program.  To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to include the puntaje variable in a nonlinear 
form and for the regression linear, squared and cubed terms are included. Results presented in 
Table 2 support the hypotheses that wealth matters (all three variables are significant) and 
indicate a nonlinear relationship between dropping out and the puntaje. In order to see this 
relationship more clearly, Figure 6 graphs puntaje against the predicted probability of dropping 
out.
13  The graph indicates that the likelihood of dropping out is highest at low levels of the 
puntaje (relatively wealthier recipients) and declines at a diminishing rate as the puntaje 
increases. The results support the hypothesis that conditionality is leading to self-selection out of 
the program and is thus acting as a targeting mechanism. Note, however, that while there is a 
small increase in dropouts at the poorer end of the distribution, the level of dropouts is relatively 
                                                           
13 This is calculated using the mean predicted probability of dropping out for the relevant range of values of puntaje.    12
small. Thus, it appears concerns that conditionality may be pushing out the extreme poor are 
unsupported by evidence.  
While the puntaje measures individual wealth, the marginality index examines how 
marginal a community is and this variable is included to determine if dropouts are more likely in 
more or less marginal communities.  The results indicate that the community level of marginality 
does not influence dropouts.  These results hold even when nonlinear specifications are included 
(results not shown).  Along with the aforementioned concerns, there is also some reason to be 
concerned that in less marginal communities recipients may be less likely to dropout since they 
are fewer in number and thus have less social interaction with other recipients and may have 
more difficulty in interacting with Oportunidades.  To examine this hypothesis, the regression 
presented in Table 2 is rerun with all the presented variables as well as dummy variable to 
represent households with low marginality indices (from better off communities) and high 
marginality indices (from worse off communities).  The dummies were included along with 
interaction terms between these dummies and the puntaje variables.  The results (not shown) 
were significant for both sets of interaction terms suggesting the relationship between the puntaje 
and the probability of dropping out depends on how marginal a community is.  To view the 
results, Figure 7 shows the predicted probability of dropping out for the range of values of the 
puntaje for households in low and high marginality communities.  Examining the graph the 
pattern for high marginal communities is similar to those found in general (see Figure 6).  For 
highly marginal communities, it does appear, however, that poorer households are more likely to 
drop out.  This is potentially a source of concern and should be further explored. 
[FIGURE 7 HERE] 
As noted, there are two main providers in the areas covered by Oportunidades: (i) 
Secretaria de Salud (SSA) – the public health system of the Health Secretary of Mexico – and, 
(ii) IMSS Solidaridad/Oportunidades (IMSS) – a program managed by the Mexican Institute for 
Social Security that serves the rural poor not in areas covered by social security protection. It 
might be that beneficiaries from different providers face a different likelihood of dropping out 
depending on access to services and monitoring of conditionality. The results indicate that 
recipients using IMSS as a health care provider are much less likely to drop out than those using 
SSA. This could be solely because of the fact that IMSS tends to be a more stable health 
provider. Recent graduates from medical schools, who are deployed to these health posts for 
duration of less than a year, often staff SSA. This may lead to increased mistakes in monitoring 
of conditions and of reporting failure to meet conditions. It may also be that IMSS staff get to 
know recipients better and are thus more likely to follow through to ensure recipients meet 
conditions. In either event, this is problematic in that it suggest the health care provider, who is 
required to report on whether conditions are met, has a significant influence in whether 
households dropout.  This is explored more fully below. 
The next set of variables control for changes in administration of the program.  In some 
cases, these administrative factors were designed to improve the monitoring of the program and 
in others they are administrative difficulties.  In general, the expectation is that they will increase 
the odds of dropping out since they are improvements in the monitoring of conditions of the 
program.  With the exception of the initial introduction of guidelines in 1999, all of the other 
administrative factors increased the odds of dropping out.  The results indicate that 
administration of programs can have a substantial influence on whether recipients stay in the 
program.  This is only problematic if these administrative changes result increased inefficiencies.   13
[FIGURE 8 HERE] 
  Finally, the results on the time variables are considered.  As noted previously, a 
polynomial is used for the hazard function and the results do not vary dramatically across 
specification of the hazard.  Figure 8 shows the survival function controlling for the other factors 
that influence dropping out.  The graph clearly shows a steady decline in dropouts over time and 
mirrors those shown in Figure 3.  On average there is approximately a 0.5% rate of dropout for 
each period or around 3% per year which leads to a 20% in dropouts over the period in question.   
[FIGURE 9 HERE] 
  The results in Table 2 indicated that whether a household is indigenous increases the odds 
of dropping out.  To examine this more carefully, an additional specification was run in which 
the hazard function was interacted with the indigenous dummy variable to test whether dropouts 
vary across time between the two populations.  The results (not shown) indicate that there is a 
significant difference in dropouts over time for the indigenous population.  This can be seen in 
Figure 9. Indigenous people are dropping out at a slightly faster rate than the non-indigenous 
population.  At the end of the period in question, 3-4 % more indigenous people had dropped out 
compared to non-indigenous. 
[FIGURE 10 HERE] 
  Lastly, Table 2 indicates a difference in dropouts across health care provider.  Following 
a similar procedure for the indigenous variable, the role of the health care provider in dropouts 
over time is examined.  The results (not shown) again indicate a strong relationship suggesting a 
different rate of dropouts for those using IMSS versus SSA.  Figure 10 shows the difference in 
dropouts over time across the health care providers.  The results are rather dramatic with a 
greater rate of dropouts and a larger number for SSA versus IMSS.  Nearly 25% of SSA 
recipients are expected to dropout over the 39 periods versus less than 10% for IMSS.  It may be 
case that this variable is capturing something else about the households that receive health care 
through each provider so it should be viewed with some caution. However, the results are 
dramatic enough to strongly suggest examining in details the reasons for this occurring.   
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper, administrative data from Mexico´s Oportunidades program are analyzed to 
shed light on the following policy questions: i) could conditionality increase the targeting 
efficiency of the programs by acting as a disincentive to remain in the program indefinitely?; ii) 
are the poorest being overburden by program requirements?; iii) what characteristics of the 
program are increasing the risks of the poorest leaving the safety net? 
Conditionality in cash transfer programs have been used for targeting resources to the 
poor by inducing self-selection into the program, so that beneficiaries of the targeted population 
participate in the program and others opt-out (Das, Do & Ozler, 2005). Workfare programs are a 
typical example, where wages paid are set below market minimum wage values for inferior 
goods (such as hardship in manual labor). While Oportunidades relies on proxy means tests to 
screen people into the program, results from this analysis indicate that conditionality seems to 
have an effect over the choice of opting out of the program and thus increasing the program’s 
overall targeting performance by screening out the non-poor. As such it satisfies two important 
criteria, that beneficiaries are willing to participate in the program and that the non-eligible   14
population finds that the conditions places greater costs than the benefits derived from remaining 
in the program (Ravallion, 2003). Different measures of relative welfare, such as the proxy 
means score, high dependency families, receiving remittances, working outside the home, were 
all negatively correlated to the probability of dropping out of the program.  
Conversely, the cost of the program’s conditionality does not seem to be overly 
burdensome for the extreme poor as they do not appear to systematically dropout of the program. 
However, we found specific instances of concern where the program may be dropping out the 
extreme poor and thus increasing the vulnerability of these households and reducing their human 
capital accumulation. The two specific instances are in the case of indigenous populations and 
the case of the extreme poor in low marginality communities, where there is likely to be greater 
inequality. A further equity concern relates to the increasing odds of dropping out due to 
operational changes. If such changes increase the efficiency of monitoring conditions, they may 
improve the value of conditionality in screening out wealthier households If, however, these 
reflect operational inadequacies, they are of concern in that they are not correlated to any specific 
welfare level and can “shock” any number of extremely vulnerable communities.  
The policy implications of the first finding argues for the inclusion of conditionality in 
program design in order to induce that beneficiary families that may have erroneously been 
included or have change their welfare status over time self-select out of the program. One must 
stress that this relationship should hold for a program in which conditionality is closely 
monitored and enforced such as the Oportunidades program. Galasso & Ravallion (2003) find 
that Argentina´s Plan Jefes y Jefas included a 20-hour community work requirement to act as a 
screening device of individuals who were already employed, and that the condition was only 
partially successful at screening the non-participation of employed individuals. They conclude 
that the requirement of 20 hours was not expensive enough for individuals employed in the 
informal sector to opt out, or to the opportunity cost of losing 20 hours of leisure. It could also be 
the case that if the 20-hour requirement was not closely monitored or enforced which de facto 
could have transformed the program in an un-conditional transfer scheme.  
Secondly, there is some concern that in less marginal communities the probability of 
dropping out is slightly higher for the extreme poor. This finding combined with a reduced 
probability for indigenous groups of dropping out should be of careful review from program 
operators. In the last few years, Oportunidades has been actively engaged in establishing reentry 
mechanisms for these sorts of cases. Much of the fieldwork during the past two years in rural 
areas has been concentrated in resurveying communities and incorporating families that may 
have dropped out but are still highly vulnerable. 
The third and related policy conclusion is that administrative “shocks”, or changes of 
certain operational processes, have had an enormous impact on the probability that families faced 
of being taken off the roster and thus losing eligibility. For example, the ability of the program to 
deliver and renew the beneficiaries’ identification cards has resulted in some instances in entire 
groups being dropout of the program. The magnitude of the shock is equivalent to covariate 
shock (droughts, floods, etc) that any of these rural communities may face and thus we conclude 
that even though the program has generated higher degrees of protection against various shocks 
that families faced
14, it has generated some of them itself by operational mishaps. In the last 
years, the program has reduced dramatically these types of shocks on the roster implementing 
                                                           
14 Skoufias & Quisumbing (2005)    15
decentralized monitoring systems to prevent these occurrences. However, the cyclicality of 
misreporting on health conditionality, particularly for those families attending state secretariat 
services is of great concern.  
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Table 1: Household charactersitics
Total Active Dropout
Characteristics of recipient
Male recipient 9.5% 8.8% 12.4%
Age 41 41 41
Years of education 2.9 2.8 3.2
Indigenous 7% 7% 6%
Single 35% 33% 43%
Works outside home 21% 20% 24%
Household characteristics
Dependency ratio 1.2 1.3 1
Number of people 5.4 5.6 4.6
Public assistance 7.9% 8.2% 7.1%
Transfers from family member 7.1% 6.6% 9.8%
Puntaje 2.5 2.6 2.1
Community characteristics
Index of marginality -0.04 -0.03 -0.11
Health provider
IMSS Solidaridad 26% 29% 10%
Household observations 16,017 13,051 2,966     21
Table 2: Duration model of dropouts
Odds Ratio z-stat
Characteristics of recipient
Male recipient 1.14 2.26
Age 0.90 -25.17
Age squared 1.00 22.11
Years of education 0.97 -4.11
Indigenous 1.22 2.36
Single 1.16 3.50
Works outside home 1.18 3.44
Household characteristics
Dependency ratio 0.89 -3.39
Number of people 0.95 -3.84
Public assistance 0.83 -2.34
Transfers from family member 1.15 2.01
Puntaje 0.42 -14.81
Puntaje squared 1.24 6.79
Puntaje cubed 0.99 -3.23
Community characteristics
Index of marginality 0.98 -0.56
Health provider
IMSS Solidaridad 0.24 -22.40
Administrative factors
Operation guidelines in effect (1999.4 onward) 7.48 18.18
Just-in-time monitoring system in effect (2000.4 onward) 4.07 12.03
Implementation of guidelines (1999.4) 0.62 -3.96
Distribution of identity cards (2003.3) 6.57 18.03
Distribution of identity cards (2001.3) 2.66 11.50
Problem with payment withdrawals (2002.6) 1.54 3.78
No delivery of debit card or no Bansafi signature (2003.2) 2.24 8.31
Correction of inclusion errors (2003.4-2003.6) 2.08 10.34
Hazard function
Time 0.53 -18.35
Time squared 1.03 15.20
Time cubed 1.00 -12.48
No. of observations 514,972
Notes: Results for state fixed effects and date of entry fixed effects are included in the 
regression but not presented in the results  
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